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ABSTRACT 
The paper discusses briefly the reasons for budgetary plight 
which faces most large cities and particularly those in the developing 
countries. The case of Nairobi, a primary city subject to many of the 
forces discussed above, is then examined in some detail and a forecast 
given of its fiscal outlook by 1985. 
The almost inevitable ?ep between revenues and expenditures is, 
in the case of Nairobi, seriously deepened by the recent abolition of 
the Graduated Personal Tax, a major revenue source of the city. Various 
methods of coping with the fiscal crisis are then discussed anda substitute 
tax measure suggested, designed not only to replace the lost GPT revenues 
but to improve the efficiency of the city's revenue structure. The 
suggested measure proposes the imposition of a municipal surcharge on 
the national income tax liability of Nairobi residents. Albeit 
tentatively, the paper examines the various economic and administrative 
aspects of the surcharge. 
METROPOLITAN REVENUE SOURCES - THE NAIROBI CASE 
INTPRODUCTION 
In the words of the author of a recent comparative study of 
municipal finance, "cities everywhere seem to be subject to an iron law of 
poverty. Even the richest cities of the world confront budgetary crises". 
There is mounting.empirical evidence that, measured on a per 
capita basis, 
a) the cost of public services in the urban centres is much 
greater than in the rural areas, 
b) these costs in the larger cities are substantially greater 
than in the smaller cities, and 
c) the unit costs of the larger cities in the developing 
countries relative to those of the smaller cities are 
greater than in the developed countries. 
Conceptually, the above propositions derive from the following 
considerations: 
1. Density is an important determinant of per capita expen-
diture -
2. Urban expenditures are subject to rising unit costs. 
3. Large cities in the developing countries experience rates 
of population increase, thence of accumulation and density, 
far above those of comparable sized cities in the industria-
lised countries. 
In most testable models of local government expenditures, 
population density emerges as a highly significant independent variable. 
This is not surprising in as much as concentration of persons in a given 
physical space gives rise to expenditures which are not required in rural 
settlements. Garbage and refuse disposal, public transportation and crime 
prevention come readily to mind. In very large cities, even factoring out 
differences in the quality of public services, rising unitr costs seem 
to be the rule, in spite of alleged economies of scale, certainly for police 
and fire protection. Large cities in the developing, world not only 
experience high rates of population increase both as a result of natural 
causes and by immigration, but are further characterised by greater 
relative concentration of cars and disposable items such as cans and bottles, 
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thus adding to the pressure on the unit costs of public services. Moreover, 
in those cities where immigration accounts for most of the population 
increase, the concurrent breakdown in such institutions as the extended 
family gives rise to higher relative expenditures on welfare and related 
functions. 
On the other side of the balance sheet, the large cities in 
the developing countries seem to be unable to cope with rising expen-
ditures 3 V e n though they have higher incomes, greater productivity and 
a broader range of opportunities than other settlements within their respec-
tive countries. This is disquieting because if large cities cannot pay 
their costs, who can? The answer lies in a variety of circumstances which 
appear to prevail in most developing countries. In the first place, a 
number of central governments in these countries are ambivalent about the 
role and function of the large cities in their midst. Many of the larger 
cities lack the administrative ability both to control their expenditures 
and to collect sufficient revenues, because the best administrative talent 
gravitates to the central government. Moreover, even those cities which 
are well run and have qualified personnel have to contend with the high 
capital cost of discontinuous infrastructure outlays, and many of these 
cities face severe restrictions on their borrowing power. Little 
wonder then that large cities in general and primary cities in the deve-
loping countries in particular face serious budgetary crises. Nairobi is 
a good case in point. This paper will examine its budgetary outlook, and 
suggest some measures which could alleviateNairobi's fiscal position. 
NAIROBI'S BUDGETARY POSITION AND OUTLOOK 
Table One below summarises the available data on Nairobi's reve-
nues and expenditures. Between 1964 and 1371, all revenues rose at an 
annual compound rate of 10.8% while current expenditures increased at 
7.5% and capital expenditure at a rate of 32% annually. While in 1964 
all expenditures, capital and current, were at £5.5 million roughly equal 
to total revenues, they exceeded them by nearly £2 million in 1971. The 
growing gap between revenues and expenditures was financed by borrowing 
and by drawing down of accumulated cash balances. 
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Table One: Nairobi City Council Revenues and Expenditures, 196*4 - 1971 
1964 1971 
Revenues (£'s Mil ) 
Current Expenditures 
Capital Expenditures 
4 o 9 
0 , 6 
5=3 10,9 
4,1 
8,4 
Total Revenue per capita (£'s) 
Total Expenditure per capita 
14-0 
15.6 
19,0 
20,9 
It would be difficult to accuse Nairobi of being prodigal with 
its resources. Even though per capita expenditures measured at current 
prices increased slightly, total per capita expenditures probably declined 
in real terms given the much larger population- Measuredas a proportion of 
the value added in the city (Nairobi GDP), expenditures rose very slightly 
from 5.7% in 1964 to 6.6% in 1971, even though Nairobi was certainly subject 
to the forces mentioned in the preceding section and in spite of the allegedly 
high income elasticity of public expenditures, Nairobi's share in capital 
formation is also surprisingly, modest even though the city generates about 
40% of Kenya's total monetary sector output and some 30% of its total 
GDP. In 1971, the capital outlays of Nairobi were less than 3% of all 
capital formation in the country and only 7% of public capital formation in 
that year.On the other hand, Nairobi capital expenditures account for over 
3/4 of the local governments' capital formation in Kenya, International 
comparisons in the field of municipal finance are treacherous, but it 
might be worth noting that during the same period in Tanzania, Dar-es-Salaam 
was allotted over a quarter of all development budget expenditures. Similarly, 
in the period when GDP doubled, revenue collections as a proportion of GDP 
rose only from 5.6% to 5.8% notwithstanding the built-in flexibility of a 
significant portion of the city's' revenue structure. The breakdown of the 
revenues by source is given in Table Two. The Graduated Personal Tax did show 
a growth rate of nearly 17% over the period, compared with the growth rate 
of total output which averaged slightly over 10% annually- On the other 
hand, revenue from rates on property grew at only 8,6% and revenue from so 
called departmental income (fees, fines and charges)grew at an annual rate 
of below 6%. 
In projecting Nairobi's expenditures till 1985 , the Nairobi 
Urban Study Group has assumed very modest targets and standards and has 
incorporated into annual expenditure figures smoothed-out capital outlays 
as well as related recurrent expenditures, but it did not consider additional 
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functions beyond those existing in 1971. In that year the general fund 
current expenditure (excluding, water and sewerage) amounted to £6.5 million, 
with education and public health accounting for slightly over half, about 
equally divided between these two functions. General Fund capital expen-
diture i n 1971 amounted to £2.8 million with housing the most important 
single item. Over the period 1969-1971 housing accounted for over half 
of all Nairobi City Council capital outlays. 
Table Two: Composition of Nairobi City Council Revenues, 1964 and 1971 
£1000's 1964 1971 
Rates (unimproved site value) 
Graduated Personal Tax 
Departmental Income 
Miscellaneous 
Total General Fund 
Tenant Purchase and Housing 
Sewerage 
Water 
Total Revenue 
1,430 
1,216 
1,587 
85 
2,639 
3,62.6 
2,366 
126 
4,318 
309 
687 
8,657 
369 
622 
1,261 
5,314 10,909 
The annual total expenditures thus projected give a 1985 value of 
nearly £30 million against an estimated total revenues of some £22 
million. The revenue projection assumes the continuance of the Graduated 
Personal Tax collections. In per capita terms, total expenditures would run 
by 1985 to £21 and revenues to £16, both at constant prices. Details ot the 
projections are given in Table Three. 
Table Three: Nairobi City Council Revenues and Expenditures, 1985 Projection 
£1000's 1971 1985 
i.evenues 
Rates 
Graduated Personal Tax 
:ept. Income 
Miscellaneous 
Total General Fund 
Tenant Purchase and Housing 
Total Revenue (excl. water and sewerage) 
Sewerage 
Water 
2,539 
3,626 
2,366 
126 
5,360 
7,990 
6,365 
300 
,657 
369 
20,015 
1,960 
9,026 
622 
1,261 
21,975 
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Table 3 Cont.... 
£1000's 1971 1985 
Current Expenditure, Services 
Tenant Purchase 
Training 
Provisions 
Total, current expenditures (excl.water and 
sewerage) 
Sewerage 
Water 
T 
6,287 
289 
109 
130 
19,640 
1,760 
300 
350 
6,815 
473 
873 
22,050 
2,831 
957 
5,870 
1,875 
3,788 
134 
143 
7,745 
Capital Expenditure 
General fund 
Tenant Purchase 
Total (excl. water and sewerage) 
Sewerage 
Water 
HOW TO DEAL WITH THE BUDGETARY GAP 
The projected gap between aggregate revenues and expenditures 
appears to equal the anticipated capital outlays. Of 'course, given the 
nature of the forecast, the shortfall is not likely to be exactly the 
one given in the preceding Table. The smoothing out procedure for bulky 
capital investment ;which was adopted in the forecast precludes, except 
by accident, the convergence of actual and projected figures in any one 
year. Nevertheless the fact that capital outlays seem to approximate the 
size of the budgetary gap would suggest the possibility that the gap could 
be financed by borrowing. 
The Nairobi Urban Study Group has made a lengthy study of the size oft'ne 
market for government securities, the share of that market which could 
be tapped by the Nairobi stock issues, the debt burden of those issues and 
related matters to determine whether borrowing, by itself, could fill the 
projected revenue-expenditure gap. Very briefly and tentatively, the main 
conclus ion is that by 19 85 it would be extremely unwise to count on a 
maximum volume of annual stock issues of more than some £4 million, about 
double the annual volume of external city borrowing in recent years. This con-
clusion depends on both the effects that debt service would have on the 
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budget and considerations ...of. market capacity. Even if economic consi-
derations alone were to warrant, an annual, volume of city borrowing to 
the tune of £4 million, there would, still remain considerable doubt whether 
even this amount would be permitted by the Treasury which faces its own 
serious problems of debt management. 
In any event, an annual volume of borrowing which will reach 
£4 million by the year 1985 would still require additional revenue if 
the expenditure goals are to be met. With the abolition of the Gra-
duated Personal Tax, the city faces a very acute budgetary problem and one 
which clearly requires prompt and determined action. 
One theoretical possibility would be for the city to be 
relieved of its responsibilities for such functions as education and 
health. If this were to take place, as it did for the County Councils 
in Kenya a few years ago, it would indeed make the financial affairs of 
Nairobi manageable. Taking 1985 again as the focus of the projections, 
the relinquishing of the two functions by the city would reduce aggregate 
expenditure by some £12 million, so that £4 million of borrowing would 
balance the accounts in spite of the loss of some £8 million from 
Graduated Personal Tax proceeds* 
Some sort of a case could indeed be constructed for such 
a drastic reshuffle of responsibilities between the local and the 
central government, even though the preponderance of the arguments in 
favor of municipal control over these functions, both political and 
economic, appears undisputable. But in present day Kenya the issue 
does not really arise. The central government is both unwilling and 
unable to assume responsibility for municipal primary education and for 
health. It should be noted, for example, that since the national Government 
took over the counties responsibilities for primary education some 3 years 
ago, no new schools have been built. In a recent budget speech, which 
confirmed the abolition of the Graduated Personal Tax, the Minister of 
Finance and Planning had this to say: 
I am aware that the abolition of GPT ' Graduated Personal Tax 
will aggravate the problem of financing the services of the 
municipalities. I have, however, provided K£2 million in the 
Expenditure Estimates for grants-in-aid to the municipalities 
in order to reimburse them for the GPT revenue they will lose 
in the first half of 1974. I shall be prepared to continue 
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a system of grants-in-aid to the municipalities for a total of 
five years, but during that period I will expect the munici-
palities to have developed their own independent source 
of revenue, particularly the land rate, in order to replace 
the Government grant - in - aid completely. 
It would be superfluous to argue against grants-in-aid in the 
light of the above statement. Whatever the merits this method of financing 
budgetary deficits may have for other cities, it is much less attractive 
for Nairobi. The share of grants-in-aid accruing to Nairobi is not 
likely to equal the share of the proceeds from GPT, even though the 
amount retained by Nairobi in 1971 was rather exceptional. 
Thus, Nairobi must increase its revenues, both in order to 
replace the loss of GPT proceeds and to reduce the budgetary gap which 
loomed ahead even before GPT was abolished. 
There can be little question that Nairobi has a considerable 
and as yet untapped taxable capacity. As shown above, the per capita re-
venue collections will actually decline in the future, and even at present 
the crude indices of tax effort constructed for both Kenyan and other cities 
strongly suggest that Nairobi lags behind. 
The Nairobi Urban Study Group has completed its chief task of 
designing long-term and intermediate-term planning strategies for the 
metropolis, but its economic division continues to pursue a number of 
related tasks of which fiscal reform is among the most important. This 
task is not yet completed but a number of preliminary conclusions have 
emerged. Thus, for example, it would seem necessary to increase sub-
stantially the productivity of the land rates, chiefly by drastically chan-
ging "the approach to valuation of sites. Inspite of many arguments to 
the contrary, the present system of taxing the site values rather than 
the improvements appears consonant with the character of Nairobi and its 
development strategy. What appears to be needed is some method of insuring 
that the rapidly rising land values are promptly reflected in the valuation 
rolls. As of now, the only increase in the valuation rolls since 
Independence was due almost exclusively to the addition of new areas 
to the .city, with most of the land in the old city area carried on the rolls 
in 1970 at the same figure as in 1959, While proper revaluation of land 
is called for, there would appear to be considerable merit in an automatic, 
annual upvaluation of rolls, perhaps on the basis of some external index, 
i;e. the value added in transportation, and calibrated according to prede-
termined zones of the city-. 
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Similarly, the departmental income is capable of substantial 
increase in yield. Quite apart from such politically sensitive charges 
as school fees and housing rents, there seems little reason for not 
increasing a variety of other fees and charges which have remained at the 
same level for ten or more years,. In a number of cases, with parking 
fees the prime example, there are grounds for increasing the amounts charged 
even stronger than those of revenue requirements. 
Be that as it may, however, a realistic appraisal of the possibili-
ties of increasing the yield from existing revenue sources makes it clear 
that an additional revenue source will be required. The remainder of this 
paper will discuss this new revenue source in some detail even though it 
should be borne in mind that the proposal is still very tentative and 
that much additional study will be required before the proposal can be 
seriously considered for implementation. 
MUNICIPAL SURCHARGE ON INCOME TAX 
Those subject to national income tax in Kenya are assessed a 
tax liability payable to the national Treasury. The amount of this liabi-
lity depends on the amount of taxable income, eligible exemptions and 
exclusions, family status and other considerations, which vary with the 
legislation and regulations in force. The tax liability under the national 
income tax covers both municipal residents and other residents of Kenya. 
Under the present proposal the tax liability of those residing in 
Nairobi will constitute the tax base for Nairobi municipal tax surcharge 
and, say, the national income tax liability of Mombasa residents would 
form the basis of the Mombasa tax surcharge, should it be decided to extend 
the scope of this tax to municipalities other than Nairobi. 
On this tax base the authorised municipalities will then impose a 
surcharge expressed qs a percentage of the national tax liability 
of its residents. For example, if a Nairobi resident is required, in a given 
year, to pay £100 to the national Government in income taxes and Nairobi 
is entitled to levy a 5% surcharge the resident in question will be required 
to pay an additional £5 in that year to the Nairobi City Treasurer. 
Only those taxpayers who reside in Nairobi and who at the same time 
pay the national income tax will be subject to the Nairobi municipal surcharge. 
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Those residing outside Nairobi or other large designated cities will not be 
subject to this tax. Those residing in Nairobi or other large city, but 
not imposable under the national income tax will be exempt from the 
municipal surcharge as well. 
The extent of the base, i.e. the amount due by residents of 
a city under the national income tax, is determined by the national tax 
legislation and by the incomes of the taxpayers. The rate of the 
surcharge will be determined by the national Government in consultation 
with the municipality andean either be set at a flat rate (i.e. 5%) 
or else the enabling legislation could provide for a range, say 
between 3 and 8%, with the actual percentage set, for any given period, 
by the national Government, or else (subject to approval of the national 
Government) by the municipality. 
Were the municipal surcharge allowed cities other than 
Nairobi, there is no reason for the rate of surcharge to be the same. The 
differentiation in "the rate of surcharge would depend on the relative 
needs of the cities, their own fiscal effort, their role in the national 
economy and other factors. 
The base of the proposed national tax liability of city 
residents would encompass not only the national tax liability of indivi-
duals but also of businesses and of limited liability companies. Even 
though the national income tax liability of certain businesses and companies 
may well originate outside the jurisdiction of Nairobi or other large 
city, the municipal surcharge would be based on residence rather than on 
the origin of taxable income. 
THE RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSED TAX 
With the possible exception of wealth, income of residents 
is generally considered to be the best, the fairest and the most 
comprehensive basis for taxation even though, for a variety of reasons, 
local units of government resort largely to other tax bases. The 
reasons for the neglect of income as a source of taxable capacity 
by subnational units are manifcld, but the fact that national Govern-
ments often reserve to themselves this form of taxation counts 
among the most important. It is fortunate that in Kenya, the taxation 
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of income by a municipality is not constitutionally interdicted and 
that in fact, the Graduated Personal Tax did sanction taxing incomes 
by a municipal Government, albeit in a form which was far from 
satisfactory. The GPT taxed only a part of the income of Nairobi 
residents. It could not touch substantial incomes derived from interest, 
dividends, rents and other forms of property income. GPT discrimi-
nated in favour of the self-employed and against low income workers. 
It favoured the professional man as opposed to the civil servant. 
It was unfair in many respects and especially in that it limited the 
progression to incomes under £600 per annum. Its passing is hardly 
to be regretted, except for the severe loss of revenue entailed, but 
it did establish the principle that in Kenya the taxation of income 
is open to municipal Government. 
It is interesting to note that even though municipal taxes 
on income are not the predominate form of local revenue in other 
countries, those cities who do avail themselves of this form of 
taxation seem to be among those least dependent on central Government 
aids and grants. Cities in Finland and Sweden are often cited as 
among the best managed and most progressive. They tend to rely heavily 
on local income taxes, with Stockholm obtaining about forty percent 
of its total revenue from income taxes. Singapore is another city 
which relies heavily on income taxes. In Africa, besides Nairobi with 
GPT, Lusaka and Ibadan derived a substantial part of their revenues 
from taxes on income, with Ibadan obtaining some 35% of all its revenues 
from these taxes. 
Reliance on the income of its residents as the main source 
of municipal taxation is advisable for a number of reasons ; firstly, of 
all indices of taxable capacity income is the most likely to grow 
pari passu with the increase in municipal expenditures. Unlike the 
valuation rolls which tend to respond rather sluggishly to increases 
in site values over time, income of residents provides a continously 
growing source of taxable capacity. This is so because not only is 
the population of large cities bound to grow so that the aggregate income 
of all its citizens goes up, but also because, especially in a dynamic 
country such as Kenya, the income of most city residents will grow. 
Moreover, the taxable base related to taxable income can be expected 
to grow faster than the total income because more people will become 
subject to taxes as they cross the threshold of exemptions and exclusions. 
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This high positive elasticity of taxes based on income is an important 
fiscal considerat ion because is means that with a given rate'" of surcharge, 
the yield to the municipality will grow faster than income. This permits 
a low tax rate and reduces the need to raise the rates periodically, a 
desirable fiscal expedient since any hardship or inequity will 
be less at a lower rate. Perhaps more importantly, the steadily growing 
tax base means that there is less need for a plethora of other revenue 
measures, each one of which brings little revenue, but which in the 
aggregate cause many nuisances and bear heavily on the administrative 
capacity of even a well-run city. 
Under the concept of municipal surcharge proposed here, there is 
no need to graduate the rates as was done under the GPT. Moreover, the 
proposed surcharge can tap income which escaped from the GPT,especially 
income derived from the ownership of property. The Nairobi Urban Study 
Group estimated that some 40% of all income originating in Nairobi 
derives from sources which were not subject to taxation under GPT. Thus, 
the proposed surcharge is not only fairer and more equitable but potentially 
much more productive of revenue than GPT, even with the same rate of tax. 
For Nairobi at least, there appears to be a strong case for a 
metropolitan surcharge based on the taxable income of its residents. 
Because of its unique position and role as the centre of the East African 
Community, its corporate headquarters and its attraction to rural migrants, 
it has responsibilities to fulfil and a role to play which warrant 
a growing and fair source of revenue. It would seem reasonable to 
expect the residents who benefit from the unique facilities it offers to 
contribute to the cost of these services, and the ability to pay for these 
public services resides most effectively in the residents' incomes. 
The case for Nairobi imposing a municipal surcharge becomes parti-
cularly strong at this juncture because three things have happened at once. 
First, the abolition of GPT has created a serious loss of revenues which 
must be made up in one way or another. Second, the changeover from a 
Community income tax to a national income tax makes it both expedient 
and possible to base such a surcharge on the national income tax liability. 
Third, the recently announced changes in national income regulations will 
have the effect of extending considerably the number of Nairobi residents 
liable to the national income tax and hence to the metropolitan surcharge. 
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THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROPOSED TAX 
As for any other major revenue source, the actual administrative 
machinery will run into problems and difficulties, some of which cannot 
even be foreseen at the present time. This is not the place to present a 
detailed blueprintfor the administration of the proposed surcharge. 
Nevertheless, it can be asserted with a good deal of confidence that the 
administration and enforcement of the municipal surcharge is likely to 
be much simpler than that of any alternative designed to yield a comparable 
amount of revenue. This is so because of the circumstances mentioned 
at the end of the preceding section and also because the base of the 
tax will be clearly defined by the national tax authorities. The tax 
can be administered in one of two ways. One way would be to leave 
to the national tax authorities the task of collecting the municipal 
surcharge against the payment of a service fee. Say that the national 
tax administrators determine from the returns they receive that the 
aggregate national tax liability of Nairobi residents amounts to £25 
million. If then the surcharge rate is 5% those taxpayers resident in 
Nairobi will be required to remit an additional tax to the national 
administration, which in turn will remit the proceeds to Nairobi less an 
agreed amount or percentage. In this example, Nairobi would receive, say 
£1.20 million, this being the £1.25 million less £50,000 collection charges. 
In fact, under this system the national tax form could state that Nairobi 
residents are required to remit an additional 5% to the Treasury. 
Another way to administer the tax which although more cumbersome 
on the surface has much to recommend it, is to leave the administration 
of the tax collection and enforcement to the city. The national tax 
administration simply sends the names, addresses and amounts of tax 
liability to the city which then collects the tax. 
This method, even though it involves handling the same basic data 
twice, has the advantage of relieving the national administration of the 
task of ensuring compliance. Putting the city apparatus in charge of 
collecting its own revenues is also advantageous because zeal and 
strictness of enforcement can be expected when administration and benefits 
reside in the same authority. 
The major administrative problems likely to be encountered are 
those pertaining to the definition of residence, the treatment of 
resident income originating outside the city, the taxability of income 
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incurred during partial residence or temporary residence and so on. In 
addition, the city's powers of enforcement including legal sanctions, 
would have to be defined and assured. 
THE EXPECTED FIELD OF THE PROPOSED TAX 
At this time it is possible to present only very rough estimates 
of the taxable base, and those for Nairobi only. By the end of 1974, 
the tax liability under the Kenya income tax of those individuals and 
businesses residing in Nairobi should approximate £40 million. 
A 5% Nairobi surcharge would produce £2 million for 1974, To 
fully compensate for the loss of GPT revenue, the city would have to 
levy a 7% surcharge on the estimated 1974 taxable base. On the other 
hand, the revenues from the proposed tax can be expected to increase 
faster over time than those retainable under the GPT. In other words, 
the yield of the tax will depend on the current and future base and on 
the rate of imposable surcharge. These will also determine whether or 
not the proposed tax would be expected to compensate fully or only 
partially for the loss of GPT, with other fiscal measures filling in 
the shortfall. 
One consideration which may be of relevance is that the 
proposed tax can be expected to absorb most, if not all, of the personnel 
hitherto employed in the administration of the GPT. In fact, the 
porposed tax is likely to be more consonant with the skills and experience 
of the former GPT staff than almost any feasible alternative. 
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